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Abstract—One of the effective model checking methods is to
utilize the efficient decision procedure of SAT (or SMT) solvers.
In a SAT-based model checking, a system and its property are
encoded into a set of logic formulas and the safety is checked
based on the satisfiability of the formulas. As the encoding
methods are improved and crafted (e.g., k-induction and
IC3/PDR), verifying their correctness becomes more important.
This research aims at a formal verification of the SMC methods
using the Coq proof assistant. Our contributions are twofold:
(1) We specify the basic encoding methods, k-induction and (a
simplified version of) IC3/PDR in Coq as a set of simple and
modular encoding predicates. (2) We provide a formal proof of
the soundness of the encoding methods based on our formalized
lemmas on state sequences and paths. The specification of
the SMC methods and the soundness proofs are available at
https://github.com/dsksh/coq-smc/.
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I. INTRODUCTION
SAT-based model checking (SMC, Sect. II) is a symbolic
model checking method that delegates the main reason-
ing/search process to efficient SAT (or SMT) solvers. An
essential process in SMC is to encode a property of a state
transition system into a propositional (or predicate) logic
formula. Checking the satisfiability of the encoded formula
entails the safety of the target system. Various SMC methods
have been proposed, e.g., [1]–[6], each of which is carefully
designed by e.g. unrolling of execution paths, inductions on
paths, and over-approximation of states (Sect. II and III).
Formal verification is a way to provide a reliable SMC
tool. To the authors’ knowledge, there does not exist a
verified SMC tool. A verification involves proving the
correctness of the encoding methods, which are based on
various properties on states and execution paths of a transi-
tion system. Formalizing the correctness and the underlying
properties using a proof assistant is not a trivial task.
This research aims at formal verification of the SMC
methods using the Coq proof assistant. We first formalize
the transition systems, properties and several SMC methods
with Coq (Sect. IV). Then, we verify that the methods
correctly encode the safety of the target system; in other
words, we formalize the soundness proof of each SMC
algorithm (Sect. V). We also investigate a formalization
of the properties on states and paths of a system, which
are considered explicitly in SMC. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
• We formalize the SMC methods in a simplified manner
that adapts the existing methods into a generic scheme
described in Sect. II and III; each SMC method is pre-
sented as an implementation of the encoding methods,
which are then formalized by a shallow embedding
into Coq (Sect. IV-B). Also, we demonstrate that our
Coq specification works as a prototype SMC tool
(Sect. IV-C).
• We formally verify the soundness of the encoding
methods; in particular, for the forward, backward, k-
induction, and IC3/PDR methods (Sect. V). In the
formalization, we explicitly specify the execution paths
of a system. To facilitate this task, we develop a small
yet useful theory of state sequences and paths, which
contains lemmas on various properties and operations.
Sect. VI discusses some characteristics of our verifica-
tion results.
We consider that our result will help to provide a reliable
SMC tool and serve as a formal scheme in the development
of new encoding methods.
II. SAT-BASED MODEL CHECKING
This section introduces basics of SMC (Sect. II-A) and
an encoding process for bounded safety (Sect. II-B).
We consider a set of states, each of which is typically
encoded as a fixed-length bit vector or an integer; S denotes
a set of states. A state transition system is specified by a pair
(I, T ) of an initial condition I ⊆ S and a transition relation
T ⊆ S×S. An initial path of a system is a sequence of states
s0s1 · · · such that s0 ∈ I and T (si, si+1) for i ≥ 0. In the
following, we denote the path by s[0..] and a path fragment
si · · · sj by s[i..j]. We say a state si ∈ S is reachable iff
there exists an initial path fragment s[0..i]. Given a property
P ⊆ S, we say a system (I, T ) is safe iff every reachable
state satisfies P ; the safety is defined as
safety(I, T, P ) :↔
∀i∈N, ∀s[0..i], I(s0) → pathT (s[0..i]) → P (si), (1)
Algorithm 1: A generic SMC scheme.
Input : I , T , P , k
Output: true or false
1 F := E•(I, T, P, k);
2 for (∀s[0..m], fi) ∈ F do
3 F := F{(∀s[0..m], fi) 7→ ¬CheckSat(¬fi)};
4 end
5 return Decide(F );
Algorithm 2: Iterative process for unbounded MC.
Input : I , T , P
Output: true or false
1 for k ≥ 0 do
2 if Alg1true(I, T, P, k) then
3 return true;
4 else if ¬Alg1false(I, T, P, k) then
5 return false;
6 end
7 end
where
pathT (s[o..i]) :↔
{∧
o≤j<i T (sj , sj+1) if o < i,
true if o = i.
(2)
Example 1 We can consider a flawed 3-bit shift register [1]
as a simple state transition system with I(s) :↔ s ≥
4 and T (s, s′) :↔ (2s + 1) mod 8 = s′, where bits
are interpreted as decimal numbers. It is safe with the
property P (s) :↔ s 6= 0. An example initial path is
1002; 0012; 0112; 1112; 1112; · · · .
SAT-based model checking (SMC) [1], [7] is a formal
verification method for transition systems, which exploits
the efficient decision procedure of SAT (propositional satis-
fiability) or SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solvers. In
a model checking process, a bound k≥0 is given to restrict
the depth of the search space. As a result, either (R1) a
safety proof of the system, (R2) partial safety proof within
the depth k+1 or (R3) a counterexample of length k+1
or less will be obtained. Various SMC methods have been
proposed, e.g. [2]–[6]. There exist a number of SMC tool
implementations, e.g., nuXmv [8] and Kind 2 [9].
A. Generic Scheme of SMC
Given a target system (I, T ), a property P and a bound
k, an SMC procedure encodes the safety of the system
into a logic formula F and checks its satisfiability using
a SAT/SMT solver. This procedure can be summarized as
Alg. 1. Each SMC method provides their own encoding
method; therefore, in the algorithm, it is parameterized as
E• at Line 1. An encoding method generates a formula F
that describes a given system and a property by considering
only a finite number (which depends on k) of states. As a
result, multiple validity problems of the form ∀s[0..m], fi are
generated as sub-formulas in F ; then, they are discharged
using a SAT/SMT solver, and those sub-formulas are sub-
stituted with the results, i.e. true or false (Line 3). Here, we
denote the substitution of a sub-formula G in F with H by
F{G 7→ H}; the validity problem is solved by checking the
unsatisfiability of the negation of fi. An encoded formula F
can be an arbitrary logical combination of the sub-formulas,
e.g., ¬(∀s[0..m], f1) ∧ (∀s[0..m], f2) ∨ · · · . At Line 5, the
validity of F is determined, typically with a case analysis.
B. Encoding Bounded Safety
As a basic encoding method, we consider to encode a
bounded safety property. For SMC with the bound k, we
prepare k+2 state variables s[0..(k+1)]. Then, the following
predicate formula states that every sequence s[0..i], which
represents an initial path fragment of length k+1 or less,
reaches a safe state.
E(3)(I, T, P, k) :↔∧
0≤i≤k+1
(
∀s[0..i], I(s0)→ pathT (s[0..i])→ P (si)
)
. (3)
In the above, I , T and P are predicates on states that specify
the target system model and the property. By running Alg. 1
with E(3), which is supported by a SAT or SMT solver, we
are able to verify whether the system is safe within the bound
k (R2) or there exists a counterexample (R3).
To use a SAT solver as the CheckSat procedure in Alg 1,
the body of an encoded formula has to be (the negation of)
a conjunction. Hence, the formula (3) should be modified as∧
0≤i≤k+1
(
∀s[0..i], ¬( I(s0) ∧ pathT (s[0..i]) ∧ ¬P (si))
)
,
(4)
which is equivalent to (3) in classical logic.
III. UNBOUNDED MODEL CHECKING
For a SAT-based unbounded model checking, which
concerns a safety for arbitrary lenghs of path fragments
(R1), we typically perform an iteration of encoding and
satisfiability checking for k ≥ 0. This process is illustrated
as Alg. 2, which contains two calls for Alg. 1 (Lines 2
and 4) with different encoding methods for checking safety
(R1) or unsafety (R3). Whenever the calls result in true or
false, respectively, the process terminates. The termination
depends on the completeness of the encoding methods.
This section describes the dedicated encoding processes,
k-induction (Sect. III-A) and IC3/PDR (Sect. III-B).
A. Encoding Unbounded Safety
Encoding methods for unbounded safety that assume a
set of lasso-shaped paths and apply an induction have been
proposed. Sheeran et al. [2] have proposed six algorithms for
this purpose, which are intended for an efficient encoding
and reasoning of lasso-shaped paths. Some of the algorithms
also utilize the k-induction principle for an efficient SMC.
First, we prepare a shorthand to describe that s[o..k] is a
loop-free path.
loopF T (s[o..k]) :↔ pathT (s[o..k]) ∧
∧
o≤i<j≤k
si 6= sj (5)
Then, a sufficient condition for the safety (R1) can be
encoded in two ways.
E(6)(I, T, P, k) :↔ E(3)(I, T, P, k) ∧(
∀s[0..(k+1)], I(s0) → ¬loopF T (s[0..(k+1)])
)
(6)
E(7)(I, T, P, k) :↔ E(3)(I, T, P, k) ∧(
∀s[0..(k+1)], loopF T (s[0..(k+1)]) → P (sk+1)
)
(7)
Either of the encoding methods E(6) and E(7) considers a
fixed point of the reachability analysis from the initial states
or the unsafe states, respectively. The second quantified sub-
formula of E(6) checks that all the initial paths of length
k+1 contain a loop. The implication sub-formula of E(7) is
equivalent to ¬P (sk+1)→ ¬loopF T (s[0..(k+1)]) in classical
logic; it checks that all paths of length k+1 from an unsafe
state contain a loop. Since the safety within the bound k+1
is checked with E(3), the safety R1 is inferred as a result. As
for E(3), we can modify the second parts of E(6) and E(7) as
follows to have the sub-formulas of a conjunctive form.
∀s[0..(k+1)], ¬(I(s0) ∧ loopF T (s[0..(k+1)])) (8)
∀s[0..(k+1)], ¬(loopF T (s[0..(k+1)]) ∧ ¬P (sk+1)) (9)
Example 2 For the system in Ex. 1, E(6) holds iff k ≥ 3
since all initial paths are safe and they reach the invariant
state 1112 before the fourth step. E(7) holds iff k≥ 0 since
the unsafe state 0002 does not have a predecessor state.
Sheeran et al.’s first algorithm [2] is a hybrid method of
the two, whose encoding method is equivalent to E(6) ∨E(7).
Sheeran et al.’s subsequent algorithms apply a k-induction
and encode the safety as follows.
E(10)(I, T, P, k) :↔ E(3)(I, T, P, k) ∧ (10)(
∀s[0..(k+1)], loopF T (s[0..(k+1)])→
∧
0≤i≤k
P (si)→P (sk+1)
)
To have an unbounded model checker using our scheme
of Alg. 2, E• in Alg1true can be implemented as either E(6),
E(7), E(10) or E(6) ∨ E(7), and it can be implemented as E(3)
in Alg1false.
R0:=I
P
...
Ri Ri+1
Rk Rk+1
...s
s’
T
Figure 1: Inductive strengthening of P .
B. IC3/PDR Method
Bradley [4] has proposed an SMC method called IC3 or
PDR (property directed reachability) [5] (we refer to the
method as PDR in the sequel); it handles a sequence of over-
approximations that encloses path fragments with sets of
clauses; also, it uses the inductive relative relation between
states to refine an over-approximation. In this paper, we do
not go into the details of the method but focus on the post-
conditions of the PDR method, given an over-approximation.
We again adapt the method into our scheme of Alg. 1 and
Alg. 2.
Assume a sequence R0R1 · · · (denoted by R[0..] below) of
over-approximations of a set of reachable states in S. Then,
the post-condition of PDR for the true case is described as
follows (we refer to the whole formula as (11) and to each
sub-formula as (a)–(e)).
E(11)(I, T, P, k) :↔ ∃R[0..],
(
∀i, ∀s, I(s)→ Ri(s)
)
∧ (a)(
∀i, ∀s, Ri(s)→ P (s)
)
∧ (b)(
∀i, ∀s, Ri(s)→ Ri+1(s)
)
∧ (c)(
∀i ≤ k, ∀s, s′, Ri(s) ∧ T (s, s
′)→ Ri+1(s
′)
)
∧ (d)(
∀s, Rk(s)↔ Rk+1(s)
)
(e) (11)
The original algorithm initializes over-approximations as
R0 :↔ I and Ri :↔ P for i≥ 1, and incrementally refines
R[0..(k+1)] (for k := 0, . . .). The algorithm repeatedly (i)
detects a bad state s˜ such that ∃s˜′, Rk(s˜)∧T (s˜, s˜
′)∧¬P (s˜′),
(ii) generalizes ¬s˜ to a clause C such that ∀s, s′, Ri(s) ∧
C(s) ∧ T (s, s′) → C(s′) (for some i ≤ k), and (iii)
refines R[0..(i+1)] by adding C into the over-approximations.
Finally, the algorithm terminates when the sub-formula (e)
holds; the resulting over-approximation Rk is an inductive
strengthening of P , which is depicted in Fig. 1.
Note that the above post-condition is slightly modified
from that of the original algorithm for the sake of simplic-
ity of the verification process. First, although the original
algorithm maintains a set of clauses for each Ri, we do
not distinguish the set and Ri. Second, we weaken the sub-
formula (e) from ∃i ≤ k, ∀s, Ri(s)↔ Ri+1(s).
Example 3 For the system in Ex. 1, we can have a set of
over-approximations specified as R0 :↔ I and Ri(s) :↔
s ≥ 1 for i ≥ 1. It satisfies E(11) iff k ≥ 1.
The post-condition for the false case, which is extracted
from the PDR algorithm, is described below (the sub-
formulas are referred to as (a)–(c)).
E(12)(I, T, P, k) :↔
(
∀s, ¬(I(s) ∧ ¬P (s))
))
∧ (a)(
∀s, s′, ¬(I(s) ∧ T (s, s′) ∧ ¬P (s′))
))
∧ (b)(
∀R[0..k], s[0..(k+1)], (12)
¬
(
I(s0) ∧
∧
0≤i≤k
(Ri(si) ∧ T (si, si+1)) ∧ ¬P (si+1)
))
(c)
The sub-formulas (a) and (b) are for detecting length 0 and
1 counterexamples. The sub-formula (c) describes initial and
bounded safe paths of length k+1 or less, which is related
with R[0..k].
IV. SPECIFICATION OF SMC ENCODING METHODS
In this work, we have realized the SMC scheme in Fig. 1
in the Coq proof assistant (Sect. IV-A). We first explain how
we specify MC problems and encoding methods E• in Coq
(Sect. IV-B). Next, we show that an SMC is performed as
a theorem proving in Coq (Sect. IV-C).
A. Coq Proof Assistant and coq2smt
Coq1 (version 8.6.1) is a proof assistant based on the typed
lambda calculus, which supports predicate logic formulas,
algebraic types, higher-order functions, etc. to describe the-
orems and proofs. Using the tactic mechanism, a proof can
be described/performed efficiently and simply. In a part of
the verification, we rely on the excluded middle axiom of
the Classical_Prop module (see Sect. VI-C).
A plug-in software for Coq, coq2smt2 (commit
604f72a), has developed to invoke SMT solvers
within a Coq proof via the tactic smt solve. The tactic
handles goals of a quantifier-free form involving boolean
connectives, equalities, values/variables of type Z, etc.; it
discharges a goal using an SMT solver (e.g. CVC4 and Z3)
and reflects the result in the proof context of Coq.
B. State Transition Systems and Encoding Predicates
To specify a state transition system (I, T ), its property
P and an over-approximation R, we assume the following
types based on the definitions in Sect. II.
Definition state : Type := Z.
Definition prop: Type := state → Prop.
Definition trans : Type := state → state → Prop.
We specify the type state as Z to demonstrate a model
checking using SMT solvers. To pursue the proof tasks in
Sect. V, any type with equality = can be used as state.
I , P and R are supposed to be typed as prop. For state
sequences, we assume the following type.
Definition sseq : Type := nat → Z.
1https://coq.inria.fr
2https://github.com/wangjwchn/coq2smt
Here, we have not drawn on existing abstract types (e.g.
list) because, in our proof scheme for SMC (Sect. IV-C),
we intend to expand a proof goal into a flat formula, instead
of an inductive reduction. For instance, the predicate path
in Eq. (2), which requires a sequence ss[o..(len−o)] to be
a path fragment, is specified recursively as follows. Indeed,
this enables an expansion with an unfold application given
specific argument values.
Fixpoint path (T : trans) (ss : sseq) (o len : nat)
: Prop :=
match len with
| O ⇒ True
| S len’ ⇒ path T ss o len’ ∧
T (ss (o+len’)) (ss (o+len))
end.
Based on these types, for example, the method E(6) is
simply specified as the following predicate:
Definition forward_safety (I : prop) (T : trans)
(P : prop) (k : nat) : Prop :=
safety_k I T P (S k) ∧ lasso_fwd I T (S k).
The predicates are defined separately for each sub-formula
in Eq. (6); e.g., the predicate lasso_fwd is specified as
Definition lasso_fwd (I : prop) (T : trans) (k : nat)
: Prop :=
∀ ss : sseq, ¬(I (ss 0) ∧ loop_free T ss 0 k).
In this way, these predicates are able to be shared between
different encoding methods. For example, a hybrid method
of E(6) and E(7) is specified as follows.
Definition sheeran1_safety (I : prop) (T : trans)
(P : prop) (k : nat) : Prop :=
safety_k I T P (S k) ∧
(lasso_fwd I T (S k) ∨ lasso_bwd T P (S k)).
A set of over-approximations (i.e. a sequence of prop
values) handled by PDR is typed as the type spseq.
Definition spseq : Type := nat → prop.
Using this type, for instance the body of the sub-formula
E(12) (c) is specified as
Fixpoint spseq_sseq (I : prop) (T : trans)
(r : spseq) (ss : sseq) (i : nat) :=
match i with
| O ⇒ I ss.[0]
| S i ⇒ spseq_sseq I T r ss i ∧
r i ss.[i] ∧ T ss.[i] ss.[i+1]
end.
C. SMC as a Coq Proof Process
In this section, we demonstrate that our specification
works as a simple SMC tool (except for PDR as it requires
to prepare an over-approximation). To do so, a user first
specifies a verification problem by defining I , T and P
as objects of the types trans and prop, respectively.
Then, an SMC is performed by describing a theorem and
its proof using a template script configured for each E•.
Type checking of this proof with Coq mimics an execution
of the SMC procedure Alg. 1
For example, a template theorem and proof for SMC with
forward_safety (Eq. (6)) is described as
Theorem smc_example : forward_safety I T P k.
Proof.
unfold I , T ,P .
unfold forward_safety; unfold ...
repeat rewrite → Nat.add_0_l; ...
split.
intros; smt solve; apply by_smt.
repeat split; intros; smt solve; apply by_smt.
Qed.
Regarding Alg. 1, an E• method is implemented as a Coq
predicate (e.g., forward_safety that implements E(6)),
¬CheckSat(¬f) corresponds to discharging a sub-goal f
with smt solve, and Decide is represented as a proof
template for each encoding method.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
We have verified the encoding methods in Sect. II and
III. The correctness (including soundness, completeness and
termination) is discussed rather informally in the original
papers [2], [4]; our work aims at formalizing the soundness
proofs with Coq, following the dissussions in [2], [4]. In
this paper, we do not formalize the completeness and leave
it as a future work (see Sect. VIII). This section explains
the process of formalization and proving.
Each encoding method represents a sufficient or necessary
condition of the safety. Here, we describe the verified prop-
erties regarding Alg. 2, which returns either true or false
using two encoding methods. In the following theorems,
we relate the post-condition for true or false case with the
safety (Eq. (1)). When the algorithm returns true using E•,
its soundness is described as follows.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of True Case with E•)
∀I, T, P, k, E•(I, T, P, k) → safety(I, T, P ).
Likewise, for the false case using E•, its soundness is
described as follows.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of False Case with E•)
∀I, T, P, k, ¬E•(I, T, P, k) → ¬safety(I, T, P ).
Note that Theorem 2 does not ensure the completeness of the
true case with E•; cf. (∀k,¬q(k)→¬p) and p→(∃k, q(k))
are not logically equivalent.
Our verification is based on a shallow embedding of the
transition systems and safety properties. The above theo-
rems, which relate the safety (3) and the encoded formulas
E•, are specified directly in the logic of Coq.
In the end, we have provided formal proofs for each of
the following combinations. The proofs are explained in the
following subsections.
• Theorem 1 with E(6) and with E(7): Sect. V-B.
• Theorem 1 with E(10) (k-induction): Sect. V-C.
• Theorem 2 with E(3): Sect. V-D.
• Theorem 1 with E(11) (PDR): Sect. V-E.
• Theorem 2 with E(12) (PDR): Sect. V-F.
In the proof of Theorem 1 with E(6)–(10), we restate the
consequent safety into the form that considers only loop-free
paths. The following lemma is used for this deduction.
Lemma 1
(
∀i, s[0..i], I(s0)→ loopF T (s[0..i])→ P (si)
)
→ safety(I, T, P ).
Its proof is explained in Sect. V-G.
A. A Theory of State Sequences and Paths
For the ease of proofs, we have developed vocabularies
and lemmas on state sequences (of the type sseq) and
paths (sseq values in which each pair of concatenated states
satisfy T ). Some of the lemmas utilized in the verification
are shown in Fig. 2.
We introduce a suffix operation skipn for state
sequences, which is defined as skipn(i, s)[m..n] :=
s[(m+i)..(n+i)], and formalize the related properties. Using
skipn, we have the lemmas such as Fig. 2 (ss&p 1–3).
Various split operations for paths, loop-free paths, etc. are
useful in the verification. Therefore, we formalize those split
relations as lemmas; for instance, we have lemmas Fig. 2
(ss&p 4–6).
B. True Cases with E(6) and with E(7)
Let k′ be k+1 where k is the parameter of the encoding
method. To prove Theorem 1 for either E(6) or E(7), we split
either of the proof tasks into two cases i ≤ k′ and i > k′,
where i is that in Lemma 1. We prove that the hypothesis
in Lemma 1 holds for each case.
For the case i ≤ k′, we prove that the sub-formula
E(3)(I, T, P, k) implies the safety within the bound k
′. We
perform an induction on k′ to show the correspondence
between E(3), in which path is specified recursively, and
the consequent specified with a universal quantifier.
For the case i > k′, we split the path constraint in the
proof context in either way of the following:
I(s0) ∧ loopF T (s[0..k′]) ∧ loopF T (s[k′..i])→ P (si), (13)
I(s0)∧loopF T (s[0..(i−k′)])∧loopF T (s[(i−k′)..i])→P (si).
(14)
The split paths are illustrated in Fig. 3. The first loopF T
of Eq. (13) (resp. the second loopF T of Eq. (14)) matches
with the last sub-formula of Eq. (6) (resp. Eq. (7)). For
Eq. 14, we utilize the skipn operator in the unification
of formulas (s[(i−k′)..i] is rewritten as skipn(i, s)[0..k′]).
With the modifications of the proof contexts, the goals are
discharged by matching them with the premises.
∀P, ∀s∈sseq,∀i, j∈N, i ≥ j → P (si)→ P (skipn(i− j, s)j). (ss&p 1)
∀T, ∀s∈sseq,∀i, j∈N, pathT (s[j..(j+k)])→ pathT (skipn(j, s)[0..k]). (ss&p 2)
∀T, ∀s∈sseq,∀i, j∈N, no loopT (s[j..(j+k)])→ no loopT (skipn(j, s)[0..k]). (ss&p 3)
∀T, ∀s∈sseq,∀j, k∈N, pathT (s[0..(j+k)]) ↔ pathT (s[0..j]) ∧ pathT (s[j..k]). (ss&p 4)
∀T, ∀s∈sseq,∀j, k∈N, loopFT (s[0..(j+k)]) → loopF T (s[0..j]) ∧ loopFT (s[j..k]). (ss&p 5)
∀T, ∀s∈sseq,∀i, j∈N, T (si, si+1) ∧ pathT (s[(i+1)..j]) ↔ pathT (s[i..j]). (ss&p 6)
Figure 2: Example lemmas on state sequences and paths.
I I
i-k ’k’ i i
P P
0 0
Figure 3: Splitting of paths.
C. True Case with k-Induction
We again assume k′ := k+1. Theorem 1 with E(10) is also
proved with an application of Lemma 1 and a case split into
i ≤ k′ and i > k′.
The case i ≤ k′ is proved as in Sect. V-B.
For the case i > k′, we apply a complete induction on the
step number i in the predicate safety ; we are to prove that
the i-th state satisfies the property P assuming E(10) and the
safety within the depth i−1. The proof is done in three steps.
First, we split the constraint loopF T (s[0..i]) in the proof
context in two, loopF T (s[0..(i−k′)]) and loopF T (s[(i−k′)..i]),
as in Eq. (13). Second, we modify the indices in the sub-
formula of Eq. (10) with the lemma
∀i, k, k < i →(
∀s[0..k], loopF T (s[0..k])→
∧
0≤i<kP (si)
)
→(
∀s[(i−k)..i], loopF T (s[(i−k)..i])→
∧
i−k≤j<iP (sj)
)
.
Third, P is inferred by applying the last sub-formula of
Eq. (10) and the hypothesis of the complete induction.
D. False Case with E(3)
Theorem 2 with E(3) is proved by showing that E(3) always
hold when assuming the safety of a system. It is simply
proved by an induction on k+1.
E. True Case with PDR
Theorem 1 with E(11) is proved by several case analyses
and inductions as described below. At first, the proof goal
is split into the two goals of the form
∀I, T, P, k, E(11)(I, T, P, k)→
∀i, i ◦ k+1→ ∀s[0..i], I(s0)→path(s[0..i])→Ri(si), (15)
where ◦ is set as either ≤ or >. The consequence Ri(si) is
obtained by applying E(11) (b) to the term P (si) in safety .
For the case ◦ := ≤, we perform an induction on i.
The initial case is proved by E(11) (a). In the induction
step where i + 1 ≤ k + 1, the proof context consists
of the consequence Ri+1(si+1) and a set of hypotheses.
Ri+1(si+1) is transformed to Ri(si) by E(11) (c). As a result,
the proof context matches the induction hypothesis and be
discharged.
For Eq. (15) with ◦ := >, we again perform an induction
on i. The initial case (0 > k′, where k := k+1) imme-
diately holds. In the induction step (i + 1 > k′), the goal
Rk′(si+1) is transformed into Rk′ (skipn(i, s)1). Then, we
have Rk(skipn(i, s)0) = Rk(si) by applying E(11) (d), and
Rk′(si) by rewriting with E(11) (e). Here, we consider two
cases i = k′ and i > k′ separately. For the first case, the
goal Rk′ (si) = Rk′(sk′ ) is proved by applying Eq. (15)
with i := k′. For the case when i > k′, we are able to
deduce the goal Rk′(si) from the induction hypothesis; so
it is discharged.
F. False Case with PDR
Theorem 2 with E(12) is proved by showing that each of
the three sub-formulas of E(12) holds when assuming the
safety of a system.
The sub-formulas (a) and (b) are easy to prove.
Before the proof of the sub-formula E(12) (c), we prepare
the following lemma that states a necessary condition.
∀I, T, P,R[0..(k−1)], s[0..k],(
I(s0) ∧
∧
0≤i<k
(Ri(si) ∧ T (si, si+1)) ∧ ¬P (si+1)
)
→
I(s0) ∧
(
∀i, i < k → pathT (s[0..(i+1)]) ∧Ri(si)
)
. (16)
Note that the hypothesis is the negation of the body of E(12)
(c). It is proved by an induction on k; in the induction step,
we prove by a case split into the cases k = 0, 0 = i < k
and 0 < k ≤ i+ 1.
The proof context of the sub-formula E(12) (c) contains
the hypothesis part of Eq. (16), so it is rewritten into the
consequence part of Eq. (16). The proof goal P (sk+1) is
discharged by the assumption of the safety, but we need to
show additionally that s[0..(k+1)] is a path of the system.
Using the rewritten premise above, we are able to prove it.
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Figure 4: shorter_ss (left) and the lemma (17) (right).
G. Reduction to Loop Free Paths
Lemma 1 is proved by a complete induction on i in safety .
In the induction step, we have to show the safety of the
arbitrary paths of length i+1, assuming the safety within
the lengths less than i+1 and the safety of the loop-free
paths of length i+1. It is proved based on the observation
that the reachable states by looped paths can be reached by
a shorter path.
To compare paths with or without a loop
reaching a same state, we introduce the predicate
shorter_ss(o, k, d, s, s′) defined as
∀i∈N,
(
(i ≤ k − o→ sk−i = s
′
k−i) ∧ sk+d+i = s
′
k+i
)
.
Fig. 4 (left) illustrates the definition. It represents the fact
that a sequence s′ is a shortened sequence of s where
the fragment s[(k+1)..(k+d−1)] is removed from s; thus,
two fragments of each of the two sequences coincide as
s[o..k] = s
′
[o..k] and s[(k+d)..] = s
′
[k..].
With this predicate, we formalize the lemma
∀i∈N, ∀s∈sseq,
( ∨
0≤m<n≤i
sm = sn
)
→
¬
(
∀s′∈sseq, ∀k, d∈N, k + d > i ∨ d ≤ 0 ∨
shorter_ss(0, k, d, s, s′) ∧ si 6= s
′
i−d
)
. (17)
Note that the consequent part can be transformed into the
formula below in classical logic.
∃s′∈sseq, ∃k, d∈N, k + d ≤ i ∧ d > 0 ∧
shorter_ss(0, k, d, s, s′) ∧ si = s
′
i−d
Fig. 4 (right) illustrates this lemma. It states that, when a
sequence s contains a loop, there exists a shortened sequence
s′ and the same states are reachable with the two paths. The
consequent holds by matching the variables as k = m and
d = n−m.
To prove Lemma 1, we perform a proof by contradiction;
we assume that an unsafe path of length k exists when the
safety is checked for loop-free paths of length k. Such path
should be looped; thus, we can show that there are unsafe
shorter paths, which contradicts the induction hypothesis.
VI. REVIEW ON THE VERIFICATION RESULT
This section describes the statistical data (Sect. VI-A)
and discussions (Sect. VI-B and VI-C) regarding the overall
results of the verification with Coq described in Sect. V.
Table I: LOCs of the proof scripts.
total ss&p total ss&p
Th.1 w. E(6) 459 348 Th.2 w. E(3) 14 0
Th.1 w. E(7) 545 423 Th.1 w. E(11) 147 70
Th.1 w. E(10) 607 423 Th.2 w. E(12) 74 0
Lemma 1 352 270
A. Statistics
The LOC for each proof is shown in Table I; the third
and sixth columns show the LOC of the proofs related to
state sequences and paths described in Sect. V-A and V-G.
For instance, the overall proof script for Theorem 1 with
E(6) consisted of 459 LOC, which involved the proof script
for Lemma 1, three lemmas for the cases analyzed and
11 “ss&p” lemmas. Note that, many of the “ss&p” lemmas
were shared between the different verification tasks.
The proof of Lemma 1 was formalized with 352 LOC, in
which we reduced the lemma twice into other proof goals;
the resulting goal was proved with nine “ss&p” lemmas.
B. Discussions
We have successfully formalized the soundness proofs
following the discussions in the original papers [2], [4]. In
the formalization, we used the lemmas in Sect. V-A and V-G
and they were reused in several proof tasks.
In the proofs, a number of inductions were performed
based on the recursive definitions of the encoding predicates
and the path lengths under consideration. In each induction
step, proof context was carefully modified to apply prepared
lemmas; in some proofs, rewriting with the skipn expres-
sion and applying path splitting lemmas were useful.
A fair amount of LOCs were devoted to Lemma 1 as it
required to perform a proof by contradiction and translation
between loop paths and shorter paths (Sect. V-G).
The proofs for PDR (Sect. V-E and V-F) consisted of
a number of case analyses and inductions; the split goals
were discharged by applying sub-formulas of E(11) and E(12).
It was less often to describe paths explicitly in the proof
contexts than the other methods and thus the resulting proofs
became relatively small.
C. Use of Classical Logic
In the proof, we used several lemmas of the
Classical_prop module. On the other hand, we tried
to minimize the proofs that require those lemmas. As a
result, we identified the two parts in the proofs: (i) the
transformation into conjunctions at the front-end of each
encoding method (e.g. from (3) to (4), from (6) to (8), etc.).
(ii) the proof of Lemma 1. The other proofs were formalized
without the use of classical logic.
We conjecture that the use of the law of excluded middle
is essential in the parts (i) and (ii). In (ii), it was used to
apply the law of double negation to perform a proof by
contradiction, to obtain the contraposition of Eq. (17), and
to decompose the negation of the loop_free clause.
VII. RELATED WORK
As far as we know, there has been no formally verified
SMC tool. Issues in the SMC tools include the possibility
of flaws in encoding methods and their implementations.
Our tool demonstrates that a reliable SMC is possible by
directly using a verified implementation. On the other hand,
lack of certification for (especially “safe”) verification results
becomes another issue [9], [10].
For generic model checking, there exist several verified
tools. Sprenger [11] has formalized the modal µ-calculus and
a dedicated model checker in Coq. Amjad [12] has proposed
to embed a symbolic model checker with its underlying BDD
within the HOL tool. More recently, Esparza et al. [13] have
developed more practical and verified LTL model checker,
which has been specified and verified in Isabelle/HOL and
then extracted as an ML implementation. Wimmer and
Lammich [14] have proposed a verified model checker
based on timed automata, in which model checking with
abstraction of continuous states has been formalized and
verified. In those verification tasks, the correctness of model
checking algorithms was verified by relating the outputs of
algorithms and the semantics of properties. When compared
to our work, formalization with state sequences and paths
that considers lengths/shifting/splitting seems specific in our
work. In the previous work except [13], the formalizations
were based on the set of states and paths were not considered
explicitly. In [13], paths were considered but operations
seemed simpler than ours.
As a slightly different line of work, there have been
methods that generate proof certifications from provers e.g.
SAT/SMT solvers [9], [15] and model checkers [10]. They
propose to verify a result computed by the provers by
verifying the generated certificates on a theorem prover. Our
purpose is different from those works but integration of our
work with certification might enable constructive combined
SMC and deduction.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We specified the SMC methods and formalized their
soundness proofs on Coq. We consider that our result
provides an example formal proof, which is not trivial to
perform on a proof assistant like Coq. The specification of
the SMC methods and the soundness proofs are available at
https://github.com/dsksh/coq-smc/.
There are several future work directions. First, we can
continue the verification task to obtain the formal correctness
proof. A difficulty in the proof of completeness will be the
formalization of properties such as “an infinite sequence
of finite states should contain a loop.” We consider that
it requires another effort in the development of the theory
of paths. Second direction is to consider other SMC meth-
ods (including newly improved methods), target systems
and properties, e.g. liveness properties and the k-Liveness
method (e.g. [6]). Otherwise, formalization of the encoding
methods based on the bounded semantics [1] will be in-
teresting. Third, a verification and extraction of a practical
SMC tool will be valuable.
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